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1.  Problem  Description 
The TLPM enables the sale of cargo capacity based mainly on price, yet still satisfies 
customer level of service requirements. The specific focus of the study is the reverse 
auction format, where shippers post loads and carriers compete over them (bidding).  
The auctions operate in real time and transaction volumes and prices reflect the status of 
demand and supply.  
The market is comprised of shippers that independently call for shipment procurement 
auctions, and carriers, that participate in the procurement auctions (we assume that the 
probability of two auctions being called at the same time is zero). Auctions are 
performed one at a time as shipments arrive to the auction market. Shippers generate a 
stream of shipments, with corresponding attributes, according to predetermined 
probability distribution functions. Shipment attributes include origin and destination, 
time windows, and reservation price. Reservation price is the maximum amount that the 
shipper is willing to pay for the transportation service. It is assumed that an auction 
announcement, bidding, and resolution take place in real time, thereby precluding the 
option of bidding on two auctions simultaneously.  
 
In the TLPM there are 2  carriers competing.  A carrier is denoted by i∈ℑ  
where {1,2}ℑ = is the set of all carriers. Let the shipment/auction arrival/announcement 
epochs be 1 2{ , ,..., }Nt t t  such that 1i it t +< . Let 1 2{ , ,..., }NS s s s= , represent the set of 
arriving shipments. Let jt represent the time when shipment  js  arrives and is 
auctioned. Arrival times and shipments are not known in advance. The arrival instants 
1 2{ , ,..., }Nt t t follow a Poisson arrival process. Furthermore, arrival times and shipments 
are assumed to come from a probability space ( , , )Ω F P , with outcomes 1 2{ , ,..., }Nω ω ω . 
Any arriving shipment js  represents a realization at time jt  from the aforementioned 
probability space, therefore { , }j j jt sω = . 
 
When a contract js  arrives, a carrier tenders a price jb R∈ . After each contract 
offering, the carrier receives feedback jy  regarding the outcome of the offering. The 
information known at the time of the offering for contract js  is 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., )j jh h y y y −= , 
where 0h  denotes the information known by the carriers at time 0t  (with 0 1t t< ) before 
bidding for contract 1s . Similarly, the information known at time t  with 1j jt t t− ≤ <  
is 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., )t jh h y y y −= . The amount and quality of feedback information received will 
depend on the particulars of the market rules. The level of carrier competition is 
represented by a stationary “price” distribution ξ  (which could be correlated to the 
characteristics of the contracts). The distribution ξ  represents the best price offered by 
the competition and/or the reservation price of the shippers, whichever is least. A 
central assumption is that the distribution of contract prices are not influenced by the 
actions  (bids or fleet management related) taken by the carrier. If the carrier attains the 
right to serve contract js  then this carrier is paid an amount jξ  ; a value that is 
determined using a second price auction mechanism. 
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The fleet status when contract js  arrives is denoted as jz . There is an estate or 
assignment function such that the status of the carrier when shipment js  arrives 
is 1a( , , )j j jz t h z −=  or in general a( , , )t t jz t h z=  for any j jt t t +< ≤ .  The distance or 
cost incurred to serve the shipments in the system from time jt  up to time t  using 
assignment function a  with initial status jz  is denoted by d(a , , )jz t . Let jI  be the 
indicator variable for shipment js , such that 1jI =  if the carrier secures the offering for 
contract js  and 0jI =  otherwise. The marginal cost of serving a just arrived contract 
js  up to time t   is estimated using: 
 
( , ) d(a , | 1, ) {d(a , , ) d(a , , )}j j j j j jc s t z I t z t z t− −= = − −  
 
2.  Bidding/Pricing Problem 
There are five main characteristics of a VRPCE: a) the vehicle routing problem is 
dynamic -- service requests/contracts arrive over time; b) there is a degree of 
uncertainty about customer requests arrival times and characteristics;  c) a carrier that 
tries to act rationally must estimate the marginal cost of servicing the new service 
request;  d) each service provided has a monetary reward – this reward or revenue may 
be uncertain at the time of estimating the cost; and e) the carrier’s profit depends on the 
revenue obtained – form servicing requests – and on how effective the fleet was 
managed – service/travel costs to provide the service. The optimal bidding value in the 
TLPM is the true marginal cost for the arriving shipment js  (Figliozzi et al., 2004), 
herein denoted as *jc : 
 
1 1
*
1 1( ) ( | 1) ( | 0) (1)j jj j j j j jc c s s I s I+ ++ +π π= − = + =  
 
The term 1( )Nc s − is the expected marginal cost. If the probability of abandoning
1 the 
fleet deployment plan implemented at time 1Nt −  by time t  is denoted by , 1( | )Np t tξΩ −  
then the expected marginal cost is then calculated as: 
 
' '
'
, , 1( ) ( , ) ( | ) ( , ) (1 ( | ) )
j j
j
t t
j j j j j N
t tj
c s c s t p t t dt c s t p t t dtξ ξΩ Ω −= + −∫ ∫  
The term 1 1( | )j j js I+ +π  is defined as the expected profits from shipment 1js +  onwards 
and conditional on the previous outcome as: 
 
11 2
2
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 1
( | 1) [ ( ) | 1) ( | 1)
( | 0)(1 )]] (2)
jj j
j
j j j j j j j j
j j j
s I E E c s I I s I I
s I I
ω ξ ξ++ +
+
+ + + + + +
+ + +
π π
π
= = [( − = + = +
+ = −  
* *
1 1 1 11 | 1 0 | 1j j j j j jI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ+ + + += > = = < =  
                                                          
1 Abandoning the previous fleet schedule due to the acquisition of a new load 
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or 
11 2
2
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 1
( | 0) [ ( )| 0) ( | 1)
( | 0)(1 )]] (2 ')
jj j
j
j j j j j j j j
j j j
s I E E c s I I s I I
s I I
ω ξ ξ++ +
+
+ + + + + +
+ + +
π π
π
= = [( − = + = +
+ = −  
 
* *
1 1 1 11 | 0 0 | 0j j j j j jI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ+ + + += > = = < =  
 
3.  VRPCE Technologies 
The exact estimation of equation (1) is quite involved.  In the rich spectrum of possible 
approximations to tackle equation (1), three inherently distinct and archetypical 
approaches are evaluated. These three approaches (technologies) require different levels 
of sophistication in communication capabilities, static optimization, and the evaluation 
of opportunity costs. The three approaches are presented in an order that shows an 
increasing and distinct level of sophistication. 
 
3.1  Base or Naïve Technology 
 
This type of carrier simply serves shipments in the order they arrive. If the carrier has 
only one truck, it estimates the marginal cost of an arriving shipment js  simply as the 
additional empty distance incurred when appending js  to the end of the current route. 
If the carrier has more than one truck, the marginal cost is the cost of the truck with the 
lowest appending cost. This technology does not take into account the stochastic or 
combinatorial aspect of the cost estimation problem and is considered one of the 
simplest possible. Each vehicle acts as if it were an independent carrier; in fact, the 
auction and fleet assignment results are not altered if each vehicle submits its own bid. 
Communication and coordination overheads are reduced to a minimum. Nonetheless, 
this technology provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the performance 
of more complex and computationally demanding technologies. Denoting by 1a  the 
appending type of assignment and by 1ˆ jc  (the tilde over the cost is to indicate that it is an 
approximation to the true cost) the estimated cost using this approach are: 
 
1 ' 1 1 ' 1 ' 1ˆ ( , ) | a d(a , | 1, ) {d(a , , ) d(a , , )} (3)j j j j j j j j j jc c s t z I t z t z t− − −= = = − −  
 
It is clear that equation (3) is very simply heuristic and only approximates the expected 
marginal cost component of equation (1).  
 
3.2  Static Fleet Optimal (SFO) 
 
This carrier optimizes the static vehicle routing problem at the fleet level. The marginal 
cost is the increment in empty distance that results from adding js  to the total pool of 
trucks and loads yet to be serviced. Communication and coordination capabilities are 
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needed to feed the central dispatcher with real time data and to communicate altered 
schedules to vehicle drivers.  
 
If the problem were static, this technology would provide the optimal cost. Like the 
previous approach, it does not take into account the stochastic nature of the problem. 
This technology roughly stands for “the best” a myopic (as ignoring the future but with 
real time information) fleet dispatcher can achieve. A detailed mathematical statement 
of the mixed integer program formulation used by SFO is given in Yang et al. (2004). 
Denoting by 2a  the appending type of assignment and by 2ˆ jc  the estimated cost using 
this approach: 
 
2 ' 2 2 ' 2 ' 2ˆ ( , ) | a d(a , | 1, ) { d(a , , ) d(a , , )} (4)j j j j j j j j j jc c s t z I t z t z t− − −= = = − −  
 
It is clear that equation (4) only approximates the expected marginal cost component of 
equation (1) but in this case with the fully realized optimal myopic marginal cost. 
Additionally, in both equations (3) and (4) significant opportunity costs are completely 
ignored. 
 
3.3  One- step-look-ahead Opportunity Cost  (1SLA) 
 
The previous two approaches implicitly assume that acquiring shipment js  does not 
affect the marginal cost of future loads (i.e. 1js + , 2js + , ..., Ns ). However this is not 
entirely correct for two reasons since acquiring a new load (a) temporarily reduces the 
carriers’ capacity (capacity defined as the ability to serve additional shipments at a point 
in time) and (b) changes the current schedule and therefore possibly changes fleet 
deployment at the time of the next shipment auction. The only exception to this takes 
place in the final auction (shipment Ns ) and there are no repositioning costs (trucks do 
not return to depot). 
 
As in the previous approach, this carrier optimizes the static vehicle routing problem at 
the fleet level. This provides the static cost for adding js . In addition, this carrier tries to 
assess whether and how much winning js  affects his future profits. Given the 
complexity of estimating 1( | 1)j j js I+π =  and 1( | 0)j j js I+π =  the carrier approximates 
them (articulate) as if shipment 1ks + is the last shipment to ever arrive at the marketplace. 
The estimated future profits then become 1ˆ ( | 1)j j js I
1
+π =  and 1 1ˆ ( | 0)j j js I+π =  
respectively where the super index indicates how many steps into the future where used. 
The estimated cost in this approach is: 
 
1 1
3 2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ( | 1 ) ( | 0 ) ( 5 )j jj j j j j jc c s I s I
1 1
+ +π π= − = + =  
 
Unlike previous types, this 1SLA carrier takes into account the stochasticity of the 
problem to estimate the opportunity costs of serving js  as if there is just one more 
arrival after js  (one step look ahead). Limiting the “foresight” to just one step into the 
Evaluation of different approaches for the Truckload Vehicle Routing Problem in a Competitive 
Environment 
Figliozzi 
 
5 
future has two advantages: (a) it considerably eases the estimation and (b) it provides a 
first approximation about the importance of opportunity costs in a given competitive 
environment.  
 
In this paper 1ˆ ( | 1)j j js I
1
+π =  and 1 1ˆ ( | 0)j j js I+π =  are estimated using simulation. To 
estimate these two terms it is assumed that the carrier knows the true distribution of load 
arrivals over time and their spatial distribution Ω  (it is not discussed in this research 
how the carrier has acquired this information). This type of carrier also has an 
estimation of the endogenously generated prices or payments ξˆ ; in this paper this type 
of carrier estimates the price function as a normal function, whose mean and standard 
deviation are obtained from the whole sample of previous prices. 
 
4.  Evaluation of Online VRPCE 
The fair evaluation of the performance of dynamic routing and scheduling problems has 
long been recognized as a difficult quandary (Powell et al., 1995). The lack of 
systematic evaluation methodologies has led researchers to compare algorithms 
performances using simulation in a variety of environments or to establish performance 
bounds. These commonly used methods are particularly ill-suited for VRPCE.  
 
Trying to obtain bounds using Competitive Analysis (CA) to the VRPCE would result 
in a competition among two carriers; one denoted O for “ordinary” (whose performance 
we would like to evaluate) and one denoted P for “powerful”. The carrier O possesses a 
given fleet assignment and pricing functions, he has uncertain information about the 
future (only knows the parameters of the demand function, not the future instances), and 
only knows with certainty his private information (the status of his/her fleet). The 
carrier P possesses a given fleet assignment and bidding functions, determines the 
sequence of future shipment arrivals (the future instances), and knows with certainty his 
private information as well as O’s private information. The objective of P is to 
maximize the competitive ratio: max[ ( ) / ( )]P OS Sπ π  which is the ratio between P’s and 
O’s profits after a sequence of N contract arrivals. On the other hand, O’s objective is to 
minimize the competitive ratio: 
 
 min max[ ( ) / ( )] [ ( ) / ( )]P O P OS S S Sπ π π π= − .  
 
These perfectly conflicting objectives determine a zero sum game between carriers O 
and P. Under the extremely asymmetric assumptions of CA the results obtained would 
be trivial; i.e. the adversary P is so powerful that the competitive ratio would not be 
sufficiently distinguished among VRP assignment and pricing technologies, otherwise 
of distinct quality. If carrier P determines the sequence and characteristics of shipment 
arrivals, these can be easily chosen to minimize his fleet empty distance. If carrier P 
knows carrier O’s private information, P also knows O’s prices. With this information, 
carrier P can bid in a way that completely minimizes carrier O’s profits in a first or 
second price auction, even if P does not determine the shipment arrivals. In a second 
price auction, P can bid O’s bid plus a non negative negligible amount in order to limit 
O’s revenues. In a first price auction, P can maximize his revenues by bidding O’s bid 
minus a non negative negligible amount (Figliozzi, 2004).  
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The assumptions of competitive analysis go against standard notions of fair market 
competition and operation. Firstly, in a procurement marketplace the sequence and 
characteristics of arrivals are determined by the shippers’ needs, carriers cannot 
determine those needs. Secondly, assuming that just one carrier has full and precise 
knowledge about competitors’ private information (deployment, assignment, costing, 
and bidding functions), the information asymmetry provides such an advantage in the 
bidding process that it conceals any qualitative difference among carriers VRP and 
pricing technologies. Thirdly, competitive analysis assigns the adversary P with an off-
line technology (since P has full information) and limits O to have an online technology. 
Thus, the two carriers are not even “competing” in the same type and problem instance. 
Even limiting P’s advantage to hindsight is not fair or behaviorally sound.  
 
Alternatively, average case analysis could be used to evaluate the performance of each 
approach. Then the performance of the approaches could be compared: a) against each 
other or b) against the best possible hindsight solution. Though this could provide useful 
information about the performance of each approach in a monopoly like situation, it 
would not capture any market interaction.  On these grounds, the sole use of average 
performance (just one carrier at a time) as a basis of comparison seems unjustified.  
 
This research will compare the performance of the different approaches using a 
sequence of second price auctions. It is assumed that carriers submit as a price their 
marginal cost estimation. It seems more realistic to analyze the performance of VRPCE 
approaches in a market environment characterized by cut-throat competition and perfect 
information symmetry than in: a) a market characterized by one dominant player and 
extreme information asymmetry or b) an unrealistic monopoly like situation2.  
 
Next section describes the context and parameters chosen to study the three distinct 
approximations to the VRPCE.  
 
5.  Evaluation Setting 
The VRPCE is a new kind of problem that requires a set of parameters and settings that 
are not indispensable in other VRPs, however many settings are common.  To better 
distinguish the particular VRPCE evaluation settings the following scheme is used to 
classify settings as they relate to: a) static VRPs, b) dynamic VRPs,  c) real-time VRPs, 
d) VRCPE proper, and e) simulation related.  
 
a) Static VRP Settings 
 
a.i Type of routing problem  
The TLPM marketplace enables the sale of truckload cargo capacity based mainly on 
price, yet still satisfies customer level of service demands (in this case hard time 
windows or TW). Shipments and vehicles are fully compatible in all cases; there are no 
special shipments or commodity specific equipment.  
 
                                                          
2 Trying to combine competition and monopoly in the same environment is an oxymoron and thus an 
unrealistic approach a prima facie  
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From the carrier point of view, the ratio between shipment time window lengths and 
service time duration (or trip length) affects how many shipments can be accommodated 
in a vehicle’s route; in general, the more shipments that can be accommodated, the 
lesser the deadheading (or average empty distance). Three different TW 
length/shipment service duration ratios are simulated. These ratios are denoted short, 
medium, and long; a reference to the average time window length. The different Time 
Window Lengths (TWL) for a shipment s , where ld( )s  denotes the function that returns 
the distance between a shipment origin and destination, are: 
 
• TWL( ) 1(ld( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,1.0] ( )s s short= + +  
• TWL( ) 2(ld( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,2.0] ( )s s medium= + +  
• TWL( ) 3(ld( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,3.0] ( )s s long= + +  
 
a.ii Spatial settings (geographic area) and network characteristics. Travel/service 
times/costs. Demand distribution over the space. 
The shipments to be auctioned are circumscribed to a bounded geographical region. The 
simulated region is a 1 by 1 square area. Trucks travel from shipments origins to 
destinations at a constant unit speed (1 unit distance per unit time).  
Information concerning the origin and destination of the shipments is not known to the 
carriers in advance. Shipments origins and destinations are uniformly distributed over 
the region. There is no explicit underlying network structure in the chosen origin-
destination demand pattern. Alternatively, it can be seen as a network with infinite 
number of origins and destinations (essentially each point in the set [0,1]x[0,1]) has an 
infinite number of corresponding links. Each and every link possesses an equal 
infinitesimal probability of occurrence.)  
 
This geographical demand pattern creates a significant amount of uncertainty for fleet 
management decisions such as costing a shipment or vehicle routing. Since the degree 
of deadheading is unknown, any fleet management decision should hedge for this 
uncertainty. Shipment service times are taken into account in order to simulate 
dynamic truckload pickup-and-delivery situations (dynamic multi-vehicle routing 
problems with time-windows). It is assumed that no significant time is spent during all 
pick-ups and deliveries; however vehicles are assumed to travel at a constant speed in a 
Euclidean two dimensional space. Vehicles speeds are a unit; the average shipment 
length is ≅0.52.  
 
a.iii Significant cost/profit elements 
Carriers’ sole sources of revenue are the payments received when a contract is acquired. 
Carriers’ costs are proportional to the total distance traveled by the fleet. It is assumed 
that all carriers have the same cost per mile.   
 
b) Dynamic VRP Settings 
 
The market is comprised of shippers that independently call for shipment procurement 
auctions, and carriers, that participate in them (we assume that the likelihood of two 
auctions being called at the same time is zero). Auctions are performed one at a time as 
shipments arrive to the auction market.  
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In this research different demand/supply ratios are studied. Arrival rates range from low 
to high. At a low arrival rate, all the shipments can be served (if some shipments are not 
serviced it is due to a very short time window). At a high arrival rate carriers operate at 
capacity and many shipments have to be rejected.  It is assumed that the auction 
announcements are random and that their arrival process follows a time Poisson 
process. The expected inter-arrival time is normalized with respect to the market fleet 
size. The expected inter-arrival times are 1/ 2   arrivals per unit time per truck, 2 / 2  
arrivals per unit time per truck, and 3/ 2  arrivals per unit time per truck (low, medium, 
and high arrival rates respectively).  
 
c) Real Time  VRP Settings 
 
Response or solution time is a key consideration in real time applications. However, 
given that the objective of this paper is to analyze how much can be gained using 
different technologies, it is assumed that carriers have enough computational power to 
submit a bid before another request comes in. It is assumed that the auction 
announcement, bidding, and resolution take place in real time, thereby precluding the 
option of bidding on two auctions simultaneously. 
 
 
d) VRPCE Settings 
 
d.i Competing algorithms  
Three distinct approaches were described in section  4.  
 
d.ii Knowledge of carriers regarding arrival and price function.  
The price distribution ξ  is not known, it must be estimated from past data/observations. 
The distribution of contracts (shipments) arrival and characteristics Ω  is assumed to be 
known by all carriers. Only the 1SLA type of carrier uses an approximation of the 
endogenously generated prices or payments ξˆ  with a normal function. 
 
d.iii Market allocation rules 
In all cases it is assumed that a carrier bids only if a feasible solution has been found. If 
serving js  unavoidably violates the time window of a previously won shipment, the 
carrier simply abstains from bidding or submits a high bid that exceeds the reservation 
price of js .  
 
Allocations follow the rules of a second price reverse auction. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that carriers submit their best estimation of the service cost. The allocations 
rules are as follows: 
 
• Each carrier submits a single price; 
• The winner is the carrier with the lowest bid (which must be below the reservation 
price set as 1.41 units; otherwise the auction is declared void); 
• The item (shipment) is awarded to the winner; 
• The winner is paid either the value of the second lowest bid or the reservation price, 
whichever is the lowest; and 
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• The other carriers (not winners) do not win, pay, or receive anything 
 
e) Simulation Related Settings 
 
In this research a discrete-event simulation framework is employed. Simulations are 
used to compare how different approximations to the VRPCE perform under different 
market settings (in our case limited to arrival rates and time windows). All the Figures 
and data presented are obtained with a carriers’ fleet size of two and four vehicles. The 
results obtained reflect the steady state operation (1000 arrivals and 10 iterations) of the 
simulated system. This is obtained using an adequate warm-up period, in all cases set to 
one hundred arrivals (a warm up length more than adequate for the fleet sizes and 
shipment time windows considered).  
 
6.  Analysis of Results 
Figures 1 to 3 compare the profit performance of the approach 1 (naïve) vs. approach 2 
(SFO) with different arrival rates: low, medium, and high respectively. Figures 4 to 6 
compare the profit performance of the approach 2 (SFO) vs. approach 3 (1SLA) with 
different arrival rates: low, medium, and high respectively. All these 6 Figures also 
include 90% significant intervals around the means. A general trend illustrated in each 
of these Figures is that profit levels tend to decrease as time windows grow. As the 
routing problems become less constrained, there are more possibilities for competition 
and prices and profits follow a downward trend.  
 
As expected, a more sophisticated technology outperforms the naïve one. However, 
relative performance critically depends on the arrival rate and time windows. The 
analysis of Figures 1 to 3 indicates that the naïve approach fares well with short time 
windows only (profits are not significantly different). A similar behavior can be 
observed in Figure 7 with respect to the number of shipments served. In Figure 7 the 
results obtained for the less sophisticated carrier (approach 1 in Figure 7) are used as the 
base line. Therefore, any positive difference (indicated in red) in the last first four 
graphics demonstrates that the more sophisticated carrier (approach 2 – SFO - in this 
case) has served more shipments than the less sophisticated carrier has; negative 
differences are indicated in blue.  
 
To understand why the SFO technology outperforms the naïve one with medium and 
long time windows, it is useful to look at how the carriers estimate the cost of serving a 
shipment.  The “appending” technique has at most a polynomial number of solutions, 
while the static optimal may have an exponential number of solutions. The two 
techniques provide the same costs when they search over the same set of feasible 
solutions. Intuitively, if time window constraints are very tight, the only feasible 
solutions may be to append the arriving shipment to the end of existing routes. A very 
low arrival rate would have a similar effect. If all vehicles are idle, the two technologies 
would provide the same cost. However, the greedy polynomial approach is in serious 
disadvantage when “inserting” is possible. The insertion of shipments in existing routes 
is facilitated when time windows are wide enough to accommodate the service of 
several shipments. As the cardinality of the set of shipments to be served grows linearly, 
the set of feasible solutions can have an exponential growth. 
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Unlike previous results, when comparing 1SLA and SFO the more sophisticated 
technology does not outperform less sophisticated technology across the board with 
medium and long time windows. Profit-wise, the 1SLA carrier obtains higher or equal 
profits than the SFO, yet no clear pattern emerges from Figures 4 to 6. Figure 8 
compares the performance of the 1SLA vs. SFO technology in terms of the number of 
shipments served. The results obtained for the less sophisticated carrier (SFO carrier 
Figure 8) are used as the base line. The color convention remains unchanged. Regarding 
shipments served, the 1SLA carrier tends to serve fewer shipments when the time 
windows are short. However, 1SLA carrier tends to serve more shipments for medium 
and long time windows. Arrival rates affect these differences.  
 
The key to understanding the relative performance of technologies 1SLA and SFO is in 
the average payment received by each carrier. Figure 9 compares average payment for 
approach 2 (SFO) vs. approach 3 (1SLA) with high arrival rates and including 90% 
significant intervals around the means. Clearly, carrier 1SLA manages to obtain higher 
profits with fewer shipments served (high arrival rate, short time windows, Figure 6 and 
8) because average payments are significantly higher (Figure 9). The difference in 
pricing shipments is derived from the term: 1 1ˆ ˆ( | 1) ( | 0)j jj j j js I s I
1 1
+ +π π− = + = . As 
previously mentioned, this term measures the opportunity cost of winning the current 
auction.  Results indicate that the 1SLA carrier tends to set bid values more aggressively 
(bids lower) when the time windows are not short and the arrival rate is not too high. 
The 1SLA carrier tends to bid less aggressively (bids higher) when the time windows 
are short and the arrival rate is high. There are two distinct forces operating in the 
market: time windows and arrival rates. An increase in arrival rates increases the bid 
values (therefore the opportunity cost has increased). A decrease in time window 
lengths increases the bid values (therefore the opportunity cost has increased). 
 
Conclusions 
This analysis applies different approaches to solve the VRPCE in a truckload 
environment. A simplified approach (1SLA) to estimate opportunity costs was 
developed and applied successfully. It was shown that the estimation of opportunity 
costs in an online marketplace provides a competitive edge. However, the exact 
calculation of opportunity costs can be quite challenging.  
 
Different methods to evaluate carrier strategies were discusses. Although it was argued 
for the appropriateness of sequential second price auctions to model a competitive 
environment and evaluate carrier strategies, other evaluation methods must be seen as 
complementary. Further research work is necessary to provide a sound methodology to 
evaluate online algorithms.  
 
In summary, this research was successful to (1) recognize that different market settings 
(arrival rates, time windows) deeply affect the efficiency of routing and costing 
approaches; (2) to develop a basic approach for measuring routing technologies’ 
business value in a competitive environment; and (3) to enhance our understanding of 
the behavior of some archetypical assignment technologies in a competitive 
marketplace.  
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Figure 1  Profits and Significant Intervals (SFO vs. Naive Technology) – Low Arrival Rates 
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Figure 2  Profits and Significant Intervals (SFO vs. Naive Technology) – Medium Arrival Rates 
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Figure 3:  Profits and Significant Intervals (SFO vs. Naive Technology) – High Arrival Rates 
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Figure 4:  Profits and Significant Intervals (1SLA vs. SFO Technology) – Low Arrival Rates 
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Figure 5:  Profits and Significant Intervals (1SLA vs. SFO Technology) – Medium Arrival Rates 
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Figure 6:  Profits and Significant Intervals (1SLA vs. SFO Technology) – High Arrival Rates 
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Figure 7  Shipments Served Difference SFO vs. Naïve Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8  Shipments Served Difference 1SLA vs. SFO Technology 
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Figure 9:  Average Payment Value and Significant Difference (1SLA vs. SFO) – High Arrival Rate 
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